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Abstract: A better use of land and water resources will be necessary to meet the increasing demand for food in 
the Nile basin. Using a hydro-economic model along the storyline of three future political cooperation 
scenarios, we show that the future of food production in the Basin lies not in the expansion of intensively 
irrigated areas and the disputed reallocation of water, but in utilizing the vast forgotten potential of rainfed 
agriculture in the upstream interior, with supplemental irrigation where needed. Our results indicate that 
rainfed agriculture can cover more than 75% of the needed increase in food production by the year 2025. Many 
of the most suitable regions for rainfed agriculture in the Nile basin, however, have been destabilized by recent 
war and civil unrest. Stabilizing those regions and strengthening intra-basin cooperation via food trade seem to 
be better strategies than unilateral expansion of upstream irrigation, as the latter will reduce hydropower 
generation and relocate, rather than increase, food production. 
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1 Introduction 
Major socioeconomic and geopolitical transformations are affecting the allocation of one of the 
world’s most disputed resources: the water of the Nile River. At present, most water in the Lower 
Nile is being utilized, mainly for irrigation by downstream Egypt. Attempts to convert existing water 
allocation, primarily based on the 1959 treaty between Egypt and Sudan, to a more equitable share 
for all countries have not been successful (Nicol and Cascão, 2011). The regional balance of power is, 
however, changing: (i) the political upheaval after the Arab spring has weakened the dominance of 
Egypt (Nicol and Cascão, 2011); (ii) in an increasingly multi-polar world, access to infrastructure loans 
to build dams and irrigation infrastructure upstream has diversified (Broadman, 2008; Foster et al., 
2009); and (iii) foreign investors have taken a renewed interest in the basin’s agricultural resources, 
buying and leasing agricultural land all over the basin (Cotula et al., 2009; von Braun and Meinzen-
Dick, 2009). Amid these transformations, reallocation of Nile water is a hot issue (Cascão, 2009; 
Waterbury, 2002; Whittington et al., 2005), with many countries seeking to utilize more water for 
hydropower and food production.  
Increased food availability in the basin is urgent. According to the 2012 report of the United Nations, 
"The State of Food Insecurity in the World" (FAO et al., 2012), 100 million people in the countries of 
the basin are undernourished, which amounts to almost a third of the local population. 
Undernourishment has increased in northern and sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade, bucking 
the world-wide trend. Except for Egypt, none of the 11 Basin countries is self-sufficient in food (Omiti 
et al., 2011). Within the context of high and volatile commodity prices that favour net producers over 
buyers (Breisinger et al., 2010; Swinnen and Squicciarini, 2012), this reliance on global markets is a 
dangerous gamble: recent political instability in the Nile region has been directly linked to food price 
hikes (Arezki and Bruckner, 2011), and these risks will only increase. The population of the Basin 
countries is expected to grow by a third, from 367 million in 2012 to 488 million in 2025 (UNDP, 
2011). At the same time, world-wide competition for land, water, energy, and, ultimately, food is 
increasing (Godfray et al., 2010). Developing countries like those in the Nile, with purchasing powers 
much lower than that of other major food importing countries, are most vulnerable to global 
shortages (Rutten et al., 2013).  
We aim to support the complex policy challenge of the Nile basin by clarifying the science behind the 
discourse on water, energy and food security, exploring the possibility of national to regional food 
self-sufficiency as alternatives to an increasing reliance on global markets. We approach this from a 
hydro-economic perspective and argue that with the water resources of the Nile itself almost fully 
and productively allocated, the real solution to future food self-sufficiency for the Basin lies outside 
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the domain of water allocation and irrigated agriculture and in the rainfed areas of South Sudan and 
the Lake Victoria region. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
the potential area suitable for cultivation in South Sudan alone is as high as 30 million hectares, 
which is ten times the cropped area of Egypt. Only about 10% of that potential is currently being 
used for agriculture. Recent world-wide assessments of food production have stressed intensification 
in existing areas, rather than expansion to new areas, as the best way of increasing food production 
(Foley et al., 2011; Godfray et al., 2010; Tilman et al., 2011). The Nile basin seems to be an important 
exception, with a combination of both intensification and expansion being warranted.   
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2 Methods 
2.1 Approach 
For our research, we derived a baseline of water use (Figure 2), agricultural crop production and 
gross margin (GM) in the Nile basin around the year 2005, using an area-based hydro-economic 
model in simulation mode (WaterWise (Siderius et al., 2016); see next section and SI1). For this, a 
present–day spatial distribution of land use systems (FAO, 2009) was made consistent with country-
specific FAO crop statistics (FAO, 2004) on actual cropped area (SI2). Crop production and agricultural 
gross margin (GM) of the water-limited production was then calculated for both rainfed and irrigated 
crops.  
Next, we estimated food requirements in the basin for the year 2025. Future food self-sufficiency 
correction factors per country were based on the projected population increase up to 2025 (UNDP, 
2011) and a population-average calorie requirement of 2300 kcal/person per day (Tontisirin and de 
Haen, 2001). As such, a minimum intake was imposed, without regard for household access, dietary 
preferences, or nutritional value. We assumed that agricultural production in the Nile catchment part 
of each country will grow at the same pace as each country's average and that the proportion of food 
crops to cash crops remains the same. Future food self-sufficiency targets for the Nile basin could 
then be derived by multiplying baseline agricultural production with these correction factors (table 
2). 
Finally, we applied the hydro-economic model in optimization mode, to select those investments in 
agriculture (area-wise expansion or intensification of rainfed agriculture and new irrigation schemes) 
and hydropower (new reservoirs) that generate the highest GM using the available land and water 
resources. We explored where and how food production can best be increased and whether food 
self-sufficiency for the basin and its individual countries can be achieved by the year 2025. 
 
2.2 WaterWise model 
Our model resembles existing hydro-economic models developed for the Nile (Block and Strzepek, 
2010; Block et al., 2007; Jeuland, 2010; Whittington et al., 2005; Wu and Whittington, 2006). 
Similarly to the model of Whittington et al. (2005) it describes the whole Nile basin, including all 
existing irrigation schemes and hydropower reservoirs, and most of the proposed hydropower plans. 
Water gets transmitted through the river network using a routing scheme in combination with the 
variable storage method for the dynamics of large water bodies (swamps, reservoirs), with use in one 
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location limiting options elsewhere. Economic parameters, like the pricing of hydropower, are like 
those in earlier optimization studies. However, in contrast to the latter we did not limit our analysis 
to the river system alone, i.e. optimizing hydropower and irrigation yields, but included yield from 
rainfed land use. Land use is an endogenous variable in our model and land-use changes and the 
impact on downstream flows are thereby integrated into the optimization. The general idea behind 
the model is that it should be capable of exploring a wide range of land and water management 
options, for various scenarios with respect to basin cooperation. Such an exploratory functionality 
necessitates a relatively simple model formulation for both hydrology and agronomy.  It should then 
be realized that the model results are just indicative of a search direction. Further studies are needed 
for more accurate assessments. 
The model optimizes GM by choosing the optimal combination of land and water use options for 
each of 1371 so-called hydrotopes, units of similar soil and meteorological characteristics, given 
available water resources: 
 
 YTOT = YLU + YHP − CLWM  
with          
YLU = Σz,u,y (Prodz,u,y * Py,u - CLUu * Acz,u,y) 
CLWM = Σz,u,y (CIRRIz,u* Acz,u,y) 
 
where YTOT  represents total gross margin (in USD /yr), YLU  the profit from land use (USD/yr) based on 
production (Prod, in ton) times price of product (P, USD/ton) minus non-water costs (CLU, USD/ha) 
times the cropped area (Ac, in ha), in year y per land use u in hydrotope z. YHP is the GM of 
hydropower (USD/yr).  CLWM are the costs of local water-management measures for supporting land 
use, i.e., the variable costs of local irrigation measures (in USD/ha), depending on the amount of 
water used. Variable costs of water relate to pumping costs, which is a combination of labor, capital and 
energy costs. For the variable costs of water we used a regional estimate of 0.01 USD/m3 (Hellegers 
and Perry, 2006) .  
Crop production and related water fluxes for all land and water use options in each hydrotope are 
pre-processed by water-crop modules run in an offline mode (SI2). In the Nile application a soil 
moisture accounting model of the bucket type is used, very similar to the AQUACROP model of the 
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FAO (Raes et al., 2011), but more advanced in simulating soil storage and drainage, while simplifying 
the dynamic crop growth. Rainfall can contribute to runoff, drainage, or groundwater storage, after 
correcting for evapotranspiration. The calculation scheme for the evapotranspiration follows the FAO 
single crop coefficient method (Allen et al., 1998), applied separately to the vegetated and non-
vegetated part. Crop production is simulated with a slightly modified form of the Ky approach of FAO 
(Doorenbos and Kassam, 1979), where the ratio between actual and potential evapotranspiration is 
translated into a mean yield ratio. Actual yield in each hydrotope is then calculated by multiplying 
this mean yield ratio with a predefined potential yield. This relatively simple method has the 
advantage of being robust and requiring a minimum of data.  
WaterWise optimizes GM of food production by i. converting non-arable land into arable land, by ii. 
converting existing arable land into high-intensive variants and/or iii. by increasing the area under 
irrigation in predefined existing and new large-scale irrigation areas, depending on irrigation water 
availability and availability of investments. GM from hydropower can be increased by routing more 
water through existing hydropower schemes, if turbine capacity allows, or by investing in new ones. 
Investment costs for the conversion to irrigated area were based on a comprehensive study on the 
cost of irrigation by IFPRI  (Inocencio et al., 2007). We took the value for ‘success’ projects, under the 
optimistic assumption that new irrigation systems will be designed, constructed and maintained 
according to the latest knowledge and standards. There is a clear difference between north Africa 
and sub-Saharan Africa: the latter having, at 3552 USD/ha, only about half the conversion costs as 
North Africa. Conversion to arable land was made possible at an investment of 2174 USD/ha, 
assuming that conversion to rainfed arable land is similar to land preparation for irrigation, but 
without the additional hardware costs. Investments costs in new hydropower were mainly based on 
grey literature (see SI2). All major planned hydropower plants, including Ethiopia’s highly 
controversial Grand Renaissance Dam, were offered as options.   
The optimization was performed on the basis of two representative climate years—a relatively wet 
year (1999) followed by a dry year (2000). We did not explicitly include water demand from other 
sectors like household and industry, being relatively small compared to agricultural demand, nor the 
economic benefits of flood or sediment control, or environmental flows. Climate change was left out 
from the analysis. Within the time-frame considered, we expect that any climate change trend will be 
overshadowed by existing natural variability. However, rainfall projections for East Africa do show a 
large spread between climate models for the periods beyond 2025, adding considerable uncertainty 
to any long-term investment decision.  
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2.3 Data and schematization 
Rainfall from the tropical rainfall measurement mission (TRMM) (Kummerow et al., 1998) and daily 
reference evapotranspiration from ECMWF (Uppala et al., 2005) were used as meteorological inputs, 
with soil properties coming from FAO-UNESCO’s 1974 Soil Map of the World(1:5,000,000), soil 
classes aggregated based on maximum soil moisture storage and surface slope. A present-day spatial 
distribution of land use systems (FAO, 2009) at 5 arc minutes spatial resolution was made consistent  
with country-specific Food and Agriculture Organization crop statistics (FAOSTAT)(FAO, 2004) on 
actual cropped area by correcting for fallow area. Estimations of arable land were only available at 
national level. Simply correcting based on land area would lead to an underestimation of arable land 
within the Nile basin, the Basin part being wetter, in general. A Nile basin estimate was derived by 
multiplying the national average with the relative proportion of humid zone within the Basin area, as 
proposed by the FAO (Appelgren et al., 2000). A more detailed mapping of the irrigated areas was 
achieved by a supervised classification of Landsat images in combination with a FAO map indicating 
regions with a certain percentage of irrigation (Occurrence of irrigated areas (FGGD); (FAO, 2007; 
Siebert et al., 2005)). Training sites (areas in the map that are known to be representative) for the 
irrigated area class were determined based on prior knowledge of the location of some of the major 
irrigated areas in Egypt and Sudan. The irrigated area was then based on the classification of the 
high-resolution (30m) Landsat images, but only in regions where irrigation has been reported 
according to the lower-resolution (~10 m) FAO irrigated area map. The major irrigated areas in the 
Nile delta, in the Nile valley and in Sudan could be well identified, with their area matching the area 
as reported in FAOSTAT (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 WW-Nile arable land vs FAOSTAT arable land estimates (with irrigated area from 
AQUASTAT). ‘ Sudan’  includes both Sudan and South Sudan, but excludes irrigated area in Sudan. 
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For arable land in each country we defined a unique country-specific cropping system CCSs, 
representing a range of crops. Only crops that occupy each at least 10% of the arable area in at least 
five countries according to FAOSTAT (FAO, 2004) were included. This resulted in seven main crops: 
bananas, beans, maize, sorghum, sweet potatoes, vegetables and wheat. Because of the importance 
of groundnuts for Sudanese agriculture and rice for Egyptian agriculture these two crops were added. 
For each country, five dominant crops were selected from this subset and based on these five crops 
an average price per ton produced and cost per ha were derived for each country-specific cropping 
system. This resulted in a total of seven rainfed and two irrigated CCSs for the basin as a whole (Table 
1). Crop growth periods and monthly crop factors, to multiply the daily reference evaporation with, 
were derived from Allen et al. (1998). Except for the sorghum cropping pattern in Sudan we assumed 
a double crop rotation in each country. 
 
Table 1 Cropping system characteristics for the dominant crops as derived from FAOSTAT (current) and 
estimates for future  
  
Current 
Yield 
Potential 
yield Price Cost 
Potential 
GM 
Dominant crops in 
the 
Double 
cropping 
  ton/ha ton/ha US$/ton US$/ha US$/ha cropping system  
Current              
Burundi 3.6 4.0 216 122 736 Beans - Bananas Yes 
Egypt (irrigated) 19.5 19.5 122 183 2197 Wheat - maize Yes 
Ethiopia 1.5 4.0 149 92 499 Sorghum - wheat Yes 
Kenya 2.4 4.0 125 106 390 Beans - maize Yes 
Rwanda 3.9 4.0 218 136 730 Beans - Bananas Yes 
Sudan 0.6 4.0 152 92 510 Sorghum No 
Sudan (irrigated) 9.7 9.7 122 183 1007 Sorghum - wheat Yes 
Tanzania 1.7 4.0 147 96 486 Maize – s. potatoes Yes 
Uganda 2.9 4.0 218 123 743 Beans - Bananas Yes 
Future           
 
 
Future intensive 
 
4.0 218 123 743 Not specified Yes 
Ethiopia (newly irrigated) 19.5 122 123 2256        ,, Yes 
Sudan (newly irrigated) 19.5 122 183 2196        ,, Yes 
 
A uniform region-specific potential yield of 4 ton/ha was derived by correlating country-specific crop 
yields on rainfed arable land (in ton/ha, from FAOSTAT, 2004) with the ETa/ETp ratio of each country 
(AQUASTAT) (R2  = 0.7). While this is a gross simplification of the diversity in crop production, a 
potential yield of 4 ton/ha does correspond well with earlier estimates (e.g. Penning de Vries et al., 
1997). By using a region-specific potential yield, limiting factors other than water, for example, 
phosphate shortages, pests, or Nile region-specific restrictions in the agro-food chain infrastructure, 
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are implicitly taken into account. Economic parameters in terms of crop prices and costs per hectare 
do differ per country. Average costs and prices for each CCS were calculated using area averaging of 
the FAOSTAT data, thereby ignoring any price fluctuations or uncertainty.  
Large scale irrigation was separately schematized and parameterized. This type of irrigation in the 
Nile Basin is currently concentrated in Egypt and Sudan. Especially in Sudan and Ethiopia there is the 
land potential to increase the area irrigated (Block and Strzepek, 2010; Block et al., 2007). Irrigation 
from the main water courses was only allowed in predefined large-scale irrigation schemes, currently 
located in Egypt and Sudan. Yield, price and cost data per hectare for Egypt could be derived directly 
from FAOSTAT data (FAO, 2004), but for Sudan these were available only as an average of irrigated 
and rainfed areas combined. Sudan’s irrigated agriculture is known to underperform because of the 
siltation of irrigation canals, waterlogging, and general deterioration of operation and maintenance 
(Plusquellec, 1990). Sudan's yield per hectare was assumed to be half that of Egypt, but with the 
same costs, and cropping intensity at only half of its potential. With regard to new irrigation schemes 
in Sudan and Ethiopia, we assume that investors, water managers and irrigation engineers have 
learned from past mistakes and that productivity will match that of irrigated agriculture in Egypt. 
 
2.4 Scenarios 
We evaluated the target of food self-sufficiency under three transformative scenarios with varying 
degrees of cooperation, which are currently under debate. A hydro-economic model like WaterWise 
searches, if unrestricted, for a basin-wide optimum, thus reflecting complete cooperation and 
sharing of GM. This cooperation can then be restricted by specific boundary conditions or objective 
targets. With the model we focus on the allocation of land and water resources. The third production 
factor, labour, is assumed to be available and was not taken into account.  
The background of the "National Food Self-Sufficiency" scenario is a future where cooperation and 
trade of agricultural produce is limited and food self-sufficiency is a target of each country 
individually; GM will drop once supply exceeds demand since transaction costs will increase once 
products have to be transported to other markets. To mimic this behaviour to the extreme in the 
model, the weight of land use revenues above a country’s target is reduced to nil in the objective 
function.  In the "Upstream Hegemony" scenario, Ethiopia and Sudan maximize their agricultural GM 
for international export, irrespective of any downstream demands. All new irrigation schemes and 
the rehabilitation of existing irrigation schemes in Ethiopia and Sudan are forcefully implemented in 
the model at the investment cost required. In addition, the model maximizes agricultural GM of the 
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major irrigation schemes in these two countries via the objective function. The "Basin Cooperation" 
scenario represents a future of enhanced trade in agricultural commodities within the basin, 
underpinned by infrastructural developments and political, economic, and financial cooperation. In 
the model this is implemented by solving the objective function for the basin as a whole, giving total 
freedom to maximize land use throughout the basin to reach the food self-sufficiency target for the 
basin as a whole. One country can offset shortages in another.  
Our model includes both expansion of agricultural area and intensification with higher profits and 
costs per hectare, with investments in agriculture competing with investments in hydropower. The 
difference between expansion and intensification in the model needs to be interpreted with care. 
Especially small-scale agriculture is likely to be clustered with non-agricultural land uses in the 
present day land use classification. In addition, in war-torn regions, many fields have been 
temporarily abandoned or left fallow. In these areas, ‘expansion’ will refer more to a leap in 
production from low-yield agriculture to a form of commercial agriculture connected to regional 
markets, rather than an agricultural development from scratch. 
Livestock was not explicitly included in our analysis, as we focused on arable farming, which has a far 
larger claim on land and water resources. We assumed livestock raising to be integrated with arable 
farming in mixed agricultural systems, without explicit additional land and water demands. An 
exception to this in the Nile Basin could be the large grazing areas in Sudan and South Sudan. 
Conversion of these existing pastoral lands to arable lands was not restricted in the model. However, 
in general, the model did not select these areas for arable expansion. The mere existence of pastoral 
lands can, in itself, be an indication that biophysical circumstances make such lands less suitable for 
arable farming for example, because of erratic or strong seasonality in rainfall. 
We focused on the near future, in which we assume gradual autonomous technological progress in 
rainfed farming practices in those countries currently producing at a GM level below the regional 
maximum (Uganda, according to FAO). Such productivity-based growth, currently estimated at 1.3% 
for Sub-Saharan Africa (Fuglie and Rada, 2013), was represented by an optional ‘future intensive’ 
cropping system, activated under conditions of sufficient water availability (SI). No investments were 
required for conversions to more intense cropping systems, as they are assumed to be an 
autonomous development within the boundaries of current agronomic practices in the Basin. 
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Figure 2 Comparison of WaterWise-Nile runoff contribution and abstraction with modelled runoff (MWRI, 2005) 
and runoff derived from water balance estimates (Sutcliffe and Parks, 1999) for the main water balance areas 
of the Nile (in billion m
3
/yr). The water demand of the Delta and Valley was not available for the latter two 
studies and therefore omitted. No figures for the White Nile are available from Sutcliffe & Parks because of the 
different catchment schematization. WaterWise-Nile was validated on the wet, average, and dry years of 1999-
2001; Sutcliffe and Parks have determined the runoff based on measurement data of the period 1905-1995. The 
period of the MWRI study represents 1991-2001. Water abstractions of 70 billion M
3
 to Egypt support unofficial 
estimates, suggesting that actual releases at Aswan are higher for the period evaluated than the, often 
reported, officially allocated 55.5 billion M
3
 (Nicol and Cascão, 2011) even after correction for return flows. 
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3 Results 
Comparison of WW-Nile runoff and abstraction with modelled runoff (MWRI, 2005) and runoff 
derived from water balance estimates (Sutcliffe and Parks, 1999) for the main water balance areas of 
the Nile shows there is quite a good match between the studies, especially considering the 
complexity of the hydrology in the basin (Figure 2). Just like our study, these other studies are 
constrained by data availability and conceptual limitations. Despite these limitations, the runoff 
pattern is similar in the various subcatchments - even the evaporative losses in the Sudd match 
rather well. The largest differences can be found in subcatchments with significant irrigation water 
abstractions. The two other studies lack data on irrigation abstractions, focussing primarily on natural 
flow, i.e. runoff, from the different subcatchments. 
 
Our baseline value of annual agricultural GM of 15.4 billion USD per year is about 35% lower than the 
single available FAO estimate for the basin (Appelgren et al., 2000). The inclusion of livestock in the 
latter figure, estimated at 18-35% of African agricultural GDP (Ehui et al., 2002; Sansoucy, 1995), can 
explain a large part of the difference. To accommodate the growth of the population and meet a 
minimum food supply of 2300 kcal/p/day, total food requirements are expected to rise by 75% over 
the 2005-2025 period, according to our calculations. A major shift occurs in Egypt, which goes from 
food surplus to shortage. 
Our results show that under the "National Food Self-Sufficiency" scenario, when none of the 
countries is stimulated to have surpluses due to lack of trade, investments shift towards generating 
higher hydropower revenues and the basin as a whole will fail to become food self-sufficient (Table 
2). Egypt, Rwanda, and Eritrea are unable to produce enough food for their growing populations 
because of the restricted availability of water or agricultural lands. Under the "Upstream Hegemony" 
scenario, when there is no restriction on trade within the basin, food self-sufficiency can be realized 
in 2025 in the Nile basin at a total investment cost of 100 billion USD. As imposed in the scenario, 
Ethiopia and Sudan expand their irrigated agriculture. However, this is achieved at the expense of 
increasing the vulnerability of Egypt, with the flow of water downstream being reduced by almost 
40%, as Sudan and Ethiopia fully develop their irrigation potential. Egypt will be able to produce only 
half its needed food requirements, increasing inequality in food self-sufficiency among countries.  
Under the "Basin Cooperation" scenario, the basin attains self-sufficiency in a manner that is 
profoundly different from that of "Upstream Hegemony." Here, the Lake Victoria region and South 
Sudan are responsible for the bulk of the increase in food production through intensification and 
expansion of the areas of rainfed agriculture (Figure 3), while allowing Egypt’s highly productive 
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irrigation schemes still to receive a large amount of water. Interestingly, Ethiopia can be food self-
sufficient, but does not need to be so under the "Basin Cooperation" scenario, where climatic 
circumstances for rainfed agriculture are more favourable in South Sudan and investments there are 
prioritized. A limited reallocation of irrigation water toward Ethiopia is warranted though, as the 
country has the comparative advantage of more favourable rainfall and temperature conditions than 
Egypt or Sudan. Rehabilitating the currently underperforming schemes of Sudan is also prioritized, 
but additional expansion further north near the Merowe Dam is not, as irrigation there has no 
advantage over the existing schemes in Egypt. Water allocations of 59 billion m3 to Egypt remain 
above its share of 55.5 billion m3 of the 1959 treaty, a number often quoted. The construction of 
large hydropower reservoirs, like the Grand Renaissance Dam, does not affect Egypt’s share, neither 
does conversion of land to rainfed agriculture.  
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Figure 3 Increase in annual agricultural gross margin (in USD/ha) between baseline (2005) and 2025 (in a 
scenario of full "Basin Cooperation" on investments in land use change and water resource allocation for 
agriculture and hydropower). The regions in dark green represent increase in gross margin in the rehabilitated 
irrigated areas of Sudan and the new irrigated areas in Ethiopia, under the assumption that they reach the 
same productivity as Egypt's irrigated areas. The drawn river width is proportional to annual mean discharge in 
this scenario, with a maximum of 2622 m
3
/s after confluence of the main Nile with the Atbara in Sudan. 
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Table 2 Food self-sufficiency and the contribution of irrigated agriculture to food self-sufficiency targets for 
the main food-producing countries in the Nile basin (Nile basin area); baseline (2005) and three future 
scenarios.   
Sudan includes both Sudan and South Sudan, but changes in the contribution of rainfed production to GM refer mainly to South Sudan, 
while changes in irrigation are restricted to Sudan, which contains all the large-scale irrigated areas. 
 
Rainfed agriculture contributes over 75% of the additional food requirements in all scenarios. 
Expansion of rainfed agriculture is suggested primarily in unstable regions of South Sudan and 
northern Uganda, where the causes of underdevelopment are largely socio-political as opposed to 
biophysical. Many parts of Africa are characterized by high inter-annual and intra-annual variability in 
rainfall (Cooper et al., 2008). A reliable rainfed agriculture will require investments in local water 
harvesting and site-specific supplemental irrigation (Rockström and Falkenmark, 2015), in the long 
run supported by more accurate regional weather forecasting and smart forms of crop, water and 
soil monitoring and management. However, the pessimistic view of the whole of East African 
agriculture being drought-stricken needs refinement as well. Figure 4, which compares seasonal 
rainfall totals with crop water demand, indicates suitability for rain-fed agriculture, with country 
regions lying within the Nile basin being wetter than the countries’ total averages. Potential new 
agricultural areas identified in this study have a total crop season precipitation of about 900 mm, 
more than double the country’s average and well above crop water requirements. Our model 
suggests investments in a total area of around 11 million ha in South Sudan, about a third of the 
potential identified.  
Baseline Future Target 2025 National Food Self-Sufficiency Upstream Hegemony Basin Cooperation
Country
Contribution of 
irrigation to food 
self-sufficiency
Overall food self-
sufficiency
Needed increase in 
agriculture GM
Contribution of 
irrigation to food self-
sufficiency
Overall food self-
sufficiency
Contribution of 
irrigation to food 
self-sufficiency
Overall food self-
sufficiency
Contribution of 
irrigation to food 
self-sufficiency
Overall food self-
sufficiency
Egypt 100% 135% 17% 85% 85% 57% 57% 78% 78%
Ethiopia 0% 78% 117% 16% 100% 16% 80% 16% 80%
Sudan 28% 92% 83% ~0% 100% 122% 237% 93% 223%
Uganda 0% 102% 91% 0% 100% 0% 111% 0% 111%
Other 0% 75% 165% 0% 66% 0% 96% 0% 98%
Basin 48% 111% 74% 27% 92% 36% 103% 38% 107%
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Figure 4  Satellite-derived country-specific rainfall (source: Tropical Rainfall Measurement Mission [TRMM] data 
(Kummerow et al., 1998)) for various spatial delineations for the main cropping seasons (JJASO for Sudan, South 
Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea; MAM and SON for all other countries) in relation to average crop water 
requirements of rainfed agriculture during these months (set equal to potential crop evapotranspiration, based 
on average ECMWF reference evapotranspiration (Uppala et al., 2005) and FAO crop factors, see SI). Green 
shades indicate a range between 75% and 100% of crop water requirements. 
 
If not all countries are self-sufficient in food, as is the case under the "Basin Cooperation" scenario, 
then regional trade is required to deliver food to where it is needed. Food surplus regions in the 
basin are situated in the south, whereas the largest shortages will occur in the north: in Egypt and 
Eritrea. While basic transport infrastructure is present in the form of river connections and railroads, 
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historic trade routes need to be revived. To make optimal use of comparative advantages, staple 
food suitable for long-distance transport to Egypt could be produced in upstream areas, while Egypt 
could specialize in fresh produce for its urban population and European markets (Wichelns et al., 
2003). Export of agricultural produce from South Sudan, which, according to our calculations, could 
amount to 1.8 billion USD a year at farm-gate level, will provide diversification to this young 
economy, lessening its dependence on oil. Ethiopia’s hydropower revenues could give the country 
access to food markets, should it choose not to develop its vulnerable highland regions to the 
maximum. The recent integration of energy grids in the region shows that such cooperation is 
possible. 
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4 Discussion   
This study focusses on the potential to reach national to regional food self-sufficiency in the Nile 
basin, as an alternative to an increasing reliance on global markets. This focus on food self-sufficiency 
gave us a framework to assess the contribution of rainfed agriculture compared to that of irrigated 
agriculture and the impact of different scenarios on the allocation of Nile waters. We do not, 
however, wish to advocate basin cooperation and self-sufficiency as the only solution or criticise a 
reliance on global markets. For this, a different type of study including an analysis of the costs and 
benefits of regional to global food imports and exports would be required.  
Similar to earlier studies that focused solely on irrigated agriculture and hydropower (Whittington et 
al., 2005; Wu and Whittington, 2006), we find that basin cooperation will provide the most benefit to 
the basin – a result to be expected given the nature of the model used. Integration of rainfed 
agriculture in the objective function, however, greatly changes the solution space available. Earlier 
(non-)cooperation studies with their strong focus on Nile water allocation tend to emphasize 
potential conflicts between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia and highlight the role of Egypt as the main 
hegemon and the unequal distribution of water (Cascão, 2008; Cascão, 2009; Whittington et al., 
2005; Wu and Whittington, 2006). In our study we show that a different distribution will merely shift 
production, which will not be sufficient to feed a growing population. In rainfed agriculture areas, 
however, there still is potential to increase production. 
An integrated analysis of this kind faces numerous data uncertainties. Several (the yield of 
hydropower, the yields of the current irrigation system in Sudan and the investment cost of land 
cover change) were assessed in a partial sensitivity analysis (SI5). Changes in these variables did not 
change the results such that the main conclusions had to be revised. Inevitably, caveats remain. Our 
study aims to explore different solutions from a hydro-economic perspective, thereby simplifying the 
diversity of crop production. Limitations, e.g. in terms of soil nutrient conditions, farmers’ knowledge 
levels and access to markets, were not explicitly addressed, but implicitly included in a potential 
rainfed yield that is lower than what would be expected from crop and soil and meteorological 
characteristics alone. For agriculture in the political and socio-economic unstable regions of South 
Sudan and north Uganda to approach this potential yield requires considerable effort in creating the 
infrastructure to make knowledge, technology and inputs - seeds, fertilizers and pesticides – 
available to farmers. This study did not assess the likelihood of such developments, but rather 
advocates increased effort to make this happen. Environmental consequences of such development 
should be thoroughly assessed. We did not include environmental limitations to agricultural 
intensification or expansion. But a sustainable intensification (Godfray et al., 2010), with proper land 
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management to reduce negative externalities of increased production will be required in the Nile 
basin as much as elsewhere.  
Agricultural intensification and expansion did not lead to significant changes in downstream runoff. 
We found that seasonal evapotranspirative demand from arable lands was similar to that of the 
original vegetation in most locations. Crop factors between natural vegetation and arable crops do 
not differ much during the peak growing season, when it rains most. Small variations in 
evapotranspirative demand can be buffered by the soil column, resulting in even smaller differences 
in runoff at the aggregated time steps of a couple of days as is used in the model. In addition, 
swamps in the main surface water system, located mainly in South Sudan and evaporating a large 
fraction of runoff,  further attenuate any change in runoff from the white Nile part of the basin. It is 
in this region where most land use changes were projected by the model. In literature, increases in 
runoff after deforestation are reported, but mainly for temperate regions. Results from the tropics 
are mixed (Brown et al., 2005; Bruynzeel, 1988). One of the few extensive empirical studies from the 
Nile basin itself, by Hurni et al. (2005), suggest that intensification of land use on small test plots has 
lead to increased surface runoff, but possibly also to decreased baseflow, while soil conservation 
measures might have led to less runoff in semi-arid regions, but not in the humid parts, in the 
Ethiopian highlands. More in general, any change in land use on less than 20% of the catchment area 
appears hard to detect in runoff (Bosch and Hewlett, 1982; Brown et al., 2005; Stednick, 1996).Still, 
further study on the local and regional impact of upstream land use changes and/without associated 
soil and water conservation measures using a model with a more detailed vegetation and land 
management parameterization would be required to verify these initial findings. 
In addition, a more detailed analysis of the impact of intra-seasonal droughts on food production is 
needed to further verify whether rainfed agriculture is sustainable. This should ideally be 
supplemented with an analysis of the robustness of agriculture and hydropower development under 
a range of future climate scenarios, given the diversity in both magnitude and direction of change in 
projections for this part of the world. Ultimately, a comparison of regional versus global climate 
variability would shed more light on whether the region would be better off cooperating rather than 
depending on volatile global markets. Although regional cooperation makes countries more 
vulnerable to regional climate extremes, the region would still have a safety net during such periods 
of basin-wide scarcity: the global market. If the Nile region were to rely on the global market in the 
first place, it could no longer act as a safety net.  
Finally, our study explored the possibility of different forms of cooperation from a hydro-economic 
point of view, but did not assess the likelihood of one form of cooperation versus the other or the 
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required political and institutional setting. One such institutional option would be to reinvigorate and 
broaden the scope of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), which aims to stimulate cooperation by the nine 
Nile riparian countries. For the NBI to transit from a project towards a River Basin Organisation, a 
Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) has been outlined and a permanent institutional 
mechanism should be established, the Nile River Basin Commission (NRBC). In recent years, however, 
the NBI has been struggling to define and agree on the CFA and to establish the NRBC. Another 
option would be to embed negotiations on sharing the Nile waters within East African trade blocks, 
like COMESA, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. A focus on broader economic 
cooperation, as also suggested by Wichelns et al. (2003) and Hilhorst and Schütte (2010) and further 
explored and quantified in this paper, can provide a new perspective on the issue of sharing water 
resources by defining common benefits and a new angle for cooperation within existing initiatives.  
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5 Conclusion 
We argue that rainfed agriculture in the unstable regions like South Sudan and North Uganda is key 
to food self-sufficiency in the basin and that the heated debate on water allocation should be put 
into perspective. Conflicts over allocation can only hinder cooperation on food production and trade, 
thereby hampering the Basin’s development.  
Egypt’s policy stand in particular seems to resemble a risky strategy: obstructing cooperation within 
the basin and hindering upstream water infrastructure development, as it has done in the past, gives 
Egypt the most water. But if this lack of cooperation leads to unilateralism, increased and 
uncoordinated upstream abstractions will have serious consequences for Egypt's agriculture and 
hydropower sectors. The resulting more unequal distribution of food self-sufficiency among basin 
countries will jeopardize regional stability. However, we also show that a more equitable solution is 
available, should countries choose to cooperate on basin-wide food production and trade, albeit with 
some, but rather limited, loss of water allocations for Egypt. This will require old policy dogmas to be 
relinquished and a change of perspective both on the basin itself and on the utilization of its land and 
water resources.  
Such a change in perspective asks for a different, more integrative approach to basin governance and 
investments, away from the current focus on large water infrastructure projects. Investments for 
supporting a transition towards a climate-smart sustainable agriculture are needed, with technology 
improvement and technology adaptation and transfer essential to reduce the environmental impacts 
of increased production in the basin. The alternative is an increased dependence of Nile basin 
countries on volatile global food markets. 
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